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REFIGURING THE POSTMATERNAL – SPECIAL ISSUE – AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST 
STUDIES 
 
Embodied care and Planet Earth: Ecofeminism, maternalism and post-
maternalism 
Abstract 
The article engages with Julie Stephens (2011) book, Confronting Postmaternal Thinking, 
which argues for a ‘regendered’ feminism to counter the current postmaternal and 
neoliberalist focus on paid work to the detriment of relationships of care. Stephens points to 
ecofeminism as illustrative of a potentially new form of maternalism which could achieve this. 
While broadly agreeing with Stephens’s diagnosis of neoliberalism as amplifying the 
impoverishment of relations within natural and societal worlds, I contest her construal of 
ecofeminism and care ethics to maternalism. Instead, I propose a concept of embodied care 
that speaks to the ecofeminist imperative to support a radical restructuring of social and 
political institutions such that they focus on more-than-human flourishing. This is not to argue 
for a form of regendered maternalism, but neither does it seek to cast maternalism as 
something to be transcended. Rather, an approach to care that foregrounds connectivity  
and entangled materialisations provides an ethical resource to confront the dead hand of 
neoliberalism and a starting place from which to re-figure the postmaternal through a radical 
and liberatory focus on embodied relatedness. 
 
Key words: care ethics, maternalism, ecofeminism, embodiment, relatedness. 
 
Introduction 
Contesting the social and ecological crises amplified by neoliberalism’s focus on atomistic 
individualism requires ethical resources that empower us to imagine and act on alternatives. 
In her 2011 book, Confronting Postmaternal Thinking, Julie Stephens offers a diagnosis of 
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the problem and a potential solution. Stephens defines the postmaternal as a current sense 
of antagonism associated with ‘maternal’ values such as nurture, care, protection and 
dependency and the ways in which such ideals, which Stephens associates with practices of 
mothering, are disavowed in the public sphere and conflicted in the private. She points to 
what she regards as an ‘increasingly widespread cultural unease, if not hostility, toward 
certain expressions of the maternal and maternalist political perspectives in general’ 
(Stephens 2011, ix). Stephens argues that postmaternalism colludes with neoliberalist 
processes which celebrate the self-identical, autonomous and self-sufficient individual and 
which are disquieted by notions regarding vulnerability or emotional connectedness.  
 
For Stephens, those versions of feminism that strove to achieve gender-neutrality in the 
name of equality not only failed to challenge neoliberal policies, but were implicated in a 
neoliberalist focus on paid work to the detriment of relationships of care.i Thus Stephens 
argues for a ‘regendered’ feminism that takes up and revalues notions of care and nurturing 
and points to ecofeminism as a potential way forward. Ecofeminism has been developed in 
response to the ways in which ‘woman’, other subordinated groups (for example: the aged, 
differently abled, ethnic minorities) and ‘nature’ are conceptually linked in Western thought, 
such that processes of inferiorization have been mutually reinforcing. Ecofeminist philosophy 
has sought to instate care as a means of engaging publics and individuals with the 
ecological and social challenges with which we are faced, and as a social, political and moral 
resource from which to motivate action. This paper, however, was born out of a sense of 
frustration, not with Stephens’s confrontation with postmaternalism as an expression of 
neoliberalism, but the way in which she portrays ecofeminist philosophy and activism as 
illustrative of a new form of maternalism which could provide a means to point to and correct 
what she perceives as the limitations of a degendered feminism. 
 
Indeed, there is much to agree with in Stephens’s linked critiques of neoliberalism and 
postmaternalism. It is increasingly evident from programmes of austerity and the retreat of 
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the welfare state that humans, whether mothers or not, are valued only if they are 
economically productive, self-sufficient, self-responsible and entrepreneurial. The withdrawal 
of state support for those with caring responsibilities, the poor, the sick, children or the aged 
– all those who are unproductive – is justified by claims that such support produces 
unaffordable and morally questionable dependencies. The provision of caring and nurturing 
services is seen as the responsibility of the individual and available through the operation of 
the market through processes of commodification and marketization that continue to under-
value its contribution. 
 
Similar trends of marketization, the maximization of economic utility and a focus on individual 
responsibility are evident in neoliberalist treatments of nature also. Castree (2008) argues 
that ever greater areas of the natural world are falling subject to neoliberal practices. Some 
of these practices make claims to the effective conservation of the natural environment 
through privatisation and marketization, through seeking opportunities for growth by 
developing new, ‘greener’, products or technologies, or through making win-win eco-
efficiencies (see also Murphy 2000).  Nature, it is claimed, will thus be preserved by 
integrating environmental issues within current business and economic priorities. Castree 
(2008) also points out that many neoliberal measures and policies are undertaken that have 
no ecological motivations but are simply about the biophysical world being used as a means 
to the end of capital accumulation and that such policies can seek actively to degrade 
natural resources to generate profit and disregard environmental or social consequences. 
Seyfang (2005), meanwhile, argues that the discourses of sustainability and environment 
often adopted by governments and also by some environmental NGOs place an onus on the 
individual citizen to change their lifestyle by, for example, conserving energy, consuming 
less and recycling more or reducing car use (see also Dobson 2009; MacGregor 2014; 
Shove and Walker 2010) in a movement that mirrors that of a state retreat from the public 
provision of welfare and a focus on the self-sufficient citizen and sovereign consumer. 
However, ecological degradation, a reduction of 52 per cent in global wildlife populations 
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between 1970 and 2010 that can only be described as a genocide of animal life (World 
Wildlife Fund 2014) as well as the threats posed by climate change continue apace. 
Neoliberalizing processes amplify the impoverishment of our relations within natural and 
societal worlds, and we are led to ignore more-than-human interconnections and 
interdependencies. As a result, we are tearing apart the fabric of the planet. 
 
To challenge neoliberal thinking, but contra Stephens, I propose a concept of care that 
expresses embodied compassion and emotions that encompass, but are not reduced to, 
maternalism and which takes account of more-than-human connectivities.  The term ‘more-
than-human’ has become currency across disciplines and in a plethora of debates around 
the ontological and epistemological status of ‘nature’ wherein a central focus is placed on 
materiality, the ‘thingness’ of things and the matter of matter (eg Barad 2003, Whatmore 
1999, 2002, 2004). Probyn (2014) suggests that this is related to increasing anxiety at the 
impacts of human activity which have become so far-reaching that our current age is said to 
be a new era; the Anthropocene. This is allied to a growing awareness of the 
interconnectivity and complexity of all lives and life-forms. At the same time, Gibson Graham 
(2011) points to the exciting possibilities opened up by re-thinking forms of belonging and 
subjectivities; from being part of a larger planetary family suggesting an affect of love and 
ethic of care, to our constitution as co-beings in a ‘a vital pluriverse, suggesting an affect of 
uncertain excitement and an ethic of attuning ourselves more closely to the powers, 
capacities and dynamism’ of our co-habiting companions (Gibson Graham 2011, 3). My use 
of ‘more-than-human’ thus draws on Probyn’s recognition of the need to capture ‘the diverse 
and shifting relationships between and among humans and the many different aspects of the 
non-human’ (2014, 593). It recognises ‘the essential role of the nonhuman in the human’ 
(Bennett 2010, 152) and it attests to Haraway’s recognition that our materiality is entangled 
with that of our co-beings: 
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I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 90 percent of all the 
cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 10 percent of the cells 
are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play 
in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a 
ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm. I am vastly outnumbered by my tiny 
companions; better put, I become an adult human being in company with these tiny 
messmates. To be one is always to become with many. (Haraway 2008, 3-4, 
emphasis in original) 
 
The concept of care I propose is politicised and speaks to the ecofeminist imperative to 
support a transformative agenda that campaigns for a radical restructuring of social and 
political institutions focused on more-than-human flourishing. This foregrounds an anti-
anthropocentric concern to displace ‘the hubris of humanism so as to admit others into the 
calculus of the world’ (Braun 2004, 273).  I therefore position ecofeminist care not as a form 
of ‘regendered maternalism’ (Stephens 2011) but neither does it seek to cast maternalism as 
something to be transcended. I suggest that this is how the postmaternal could be 
reconfigured; as a way of reconceptualising relationships that does not rely on ‘feminine’ 
maternal models but which stresses a ‘feminist’ approach to connection, embodiment and 
emotion that is equally valued in both personal and political spheres. Borgerson (2007) sees 
the difference thus: feminine ethics is centred on essentialising, trait-based ethical positions 
associated with women’s ‘natural’ propensities. Feminist ethics ‘calls attention to 
relationships, responsibility and experience and their cultural, historical and psychological 
contexts’ (Borgerson 2007, 479) such that these concerns exceed women’s oppressions and 
encompass all who are impacted by exclusionary or subordinating processes and practices. 
Thus an ecofeminist notion of embodied care is developed as a social and political as well 
as individual practice necessary to bring about radical changes in our relationships in a 
more-than-human world. 
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I develop my argument as follows. First, I outline the main imperatives of ecofeminism which 
include a challenge to the excessive claims made for rationality as the ground for 
disembodied and transcendent universal truths. Neoliberalism has, as I will show, amplified 
the tendency for the subject to be cast as a rationally self-optimising, atomised individual and 
this has resulted in a disengagement with relational and embodied aspects of being. I then 
turn to Stephens’s call for maternalism, and care ethics, to be regendered; a development 
which she can discern in contemporary ecofeminism. This is important not only because it is 
a misconstrual of much ecofeminist work, but because allying ecofeminism and care ethics 
to maternalism is, as I shall demonstrate, a high risk and limiting strategy. Having set the 
context, I then come to the main contribution of the paper which is to develop an ecofeminist 
concept of embodied, care sensitive ethics and practices in which ‘mothering’ is not 
transcended but neither does it ground itself in maternalism expressed as practices of 
mothering. Caring is instead expressed as a recognition of our entangled materialities, the 
ways in which the matter of the more-than-human is interconnected, and about 
‘responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a 
part’ (Barad 2007, 393). This provides an ethical resource to confront the dead hand of 
neoliberalism and a starting place from which to re-figure the postmaternal through a radical 
and liberatory focus on embodied care. 
 
Ecofeminism, neoliberalism and maternalism 
Before turning to how ecofeminism can engage with notions of care that emphasis 
embodiment rather than maternalism, it is worth delineating the elements that broadly 
comprise an ecofeminist philosophy. I will then outline how neoliberalism has amplified the 
privileging of rationality over emotion that ecofeminism in general, and ecofeminist care 
ethics in particular, seeks to challenge. 
 
Ecofeminism emerged in the late 1970s building on women’s experiences of direct action; in 
particular, protesting the use of nuclear technologies in energy generation and weapons. It 
7 
 
was also a response to what was perceived as a masculine bias in existing environmental 
philosophies and activist groups. Covering a range of issues, such as toxic waste, 
deforestation, reproductive rights and technologies and animal liberation, ecofeminism has 
always combined activism and philosophy, developing ecological and social theory in a 
range of disciplines over the social sciences and humanities.ii  Ecofeminists largely reject a 
reformist or incrementalist approach that assumes that any changes in policy and lifestyle 
required to address mounting environmental and social problems can be achieved within 
present socio-economic structures (Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien 2005). Instead, it upholds 
a transformative agenda that will bring about more radical change and to this end, has 
initiated and supported social and political action that involves those outside the centres of 
power. 
 
Ecofeminism has been described as a patchwork quilt (Warren 2000) that encompasses a 
range of issues and views (Cuomo 2002), but common to all is the argument that systemic 
injustices such as colonialism, racism, sexism and the subordination of nature are 
interwoven and cross-cutting (Cudworth 2005; Glazebrook 2005; Plumwood 1993; Warren 
2000). Striving for new connectivities of care, responsibility and justice therefore has to be 
extended to natural and social realms as they are bound in the same systems of oppression 
and cannot be addressed in an atomistic way (Lahar 1991). These injustices are grounded in 
‘patriarchal logic’ (Plumwood 1993) expressed through sets of interrelated and hierarchical 
dualisms, such as mind/body, reason/nature, reason/emotion, masculine/feminine or 
human/nature, that support a ‘culturally exalted hegemonic ideal’ of masculinity (Kheel 2008, 
3). The privileging of the first terms in these dualisms expresses what can be regarded as 
authentically human/masculine and this is defined as superior and in opposition to the 
natural, physical or biological realm. Idealised masculinity qua humanity transcends this 
realm, while women, nature and all else that do not conform are ‘othered’ to confirm and 
justify their subordination. Thus a genuinely human self is one that is essentially rational, 
disembodied and sharply differentiated from that which is associated with, for example, 
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emotions, bodies and nature which are construed as inferior and given instrumental value 
only (Phillips 2015).  
 
For ecofeminists, the privileging of rationality within these systems of oppression has led to 
the suppression of ecocentric perspectives and values and has resulted in a patriarchal 
culture which ‘looks but doesn’t see, acts but doesn’t feel, thinks but doesn’t know’ (Kheel 
1993, 257). Instead rationality ‘has liquidated itself as an agency of ethical, moral and 
religious insight’ (Horkheimer 1947/1974, 18). Plumwood has termed the ecological crisis 
with which we are faced a ‘crisis of rationality, morality and imagination’ (Plumwood 2002, 
98) and points to: 
 
…the familiar view of reason and emotion as sharply separated and opposed, and of 
‘desire,’ caring, and love as merely ‘personal’ and ‘particular’ as opposed to the 
universality and impartiality of understanding and of ‘feminine’ emotions as 
essentially unreliable, untrustworthy, and morally irrelevant, an inferior domain to be 
dominated by a superior, disinterested (and of course masculine) reason. (Plumwood 
1991, 5) 
 
Ecofeminism thus provides a jumping-off point for re-envisioning relations within the more-
than-human in a way that values care, emotion and embodiment.  
 
The rationality to which Plumwood refers has been amplified through processes of 
neoliberalism that currently dominate economic and political thinking. Neoliberalism is a 
complex and often contradictory set of practices, best described as sets of processes of 
neoliberalisation that vary through time and geography rather than a fixed ideology (Larner 
2003). However, broadly speaking, the neoliberal agenda argues that the interests of society 
are best served by the individual maximisation of self-interest, which is most effectively 
achieved through the operation of the market and devolution of regulatory authority. The role 
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of the state is focused on ensuring that prevailing conditions are conducive for deregulation, 
the expansion of markets and the privatisation of assets (Dowling and Harvie, 2014). The 
moral qualities of subjects, presumed to pursue personal material advantage ad infinitum, 
are based on their ability to rationally assess the costs and benefits of proposed acts such 
that there is a congruence between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-
rational actor. This choice of action is ‘an expression of free will on the basis of a self-
determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject alone, who is 
also solely responsible for them’ (Lemke 2001, 201). The criterion of economic efficiency 
resulting in economic prosperity thus becomes closely linked with personal and moral well-
being and with individual freedom. It is this focus on individualism and the pursuit of 
individual advantage, where the needs of other living beings are disregarded, that an 
embodied ethics of care seeks to counter. 
 
Moreover, such a focus produces the ideal and idealised individual as a disembodied and 
disengaged subject ‘free and rational to the extent that he [sic] has fully distinguished himself 
from the natural and social worlds’ such that ‘the subject withdraws from his own body, 
which he is able to look on as an object’ (Taylor 1995, 7).  As a result, and particularly in the 
Global North, humans have become emotionally and physically distanced from the ways in 
which ouriii actions impact on nature, on ourselves and on other humans, an alienation that 
Claire Colebrook links to the lack of ‘panic, [or] any apparent, affective comportment that 
would indicate that anyone really feels or fears [the threat of climate change]’ (Colebrook 
2011, 53). The ecofeminist project challenges dualistic thinking that privileges rationality and 
rational ways of knowing in order to redress the physical, emotional and moral alienation and 
disconnection from nature that are its outcome. 
 
For Stephens (2011), a means must be found to resist neoliberalist and postmaternal 
thinking. She argues that a feminist maternalism can be reconceptualised through combining 
maternalism and egalitarianism, by resisting the privatization of motherhood and by 
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mobilising non-violent activism and an expressive politics that draws on heightened 
gendered symbols of motherhood or female sexuality. This is underpinned by Sara 
Ruddick’s notion of maternal thinking; a form of moral attentiveness and reasoning 
judgement that develops from the practices of mothering expressed as the loving 
relationship between two unequal partners. Stephens believes that resistance is already 
growing evidenced by the increasing numbers of maternal advocacy groups, particularly 
those operating through social media. These range from, for example, Mumsnet in the 
United Kingdom, who offer a platform for shared parenting advice and policy formulation 
around family issues, to CODEPINK, an anti-war coalition of mothers in the United States. 
She acknowledges the tensions apparent in such groups’ recognition and communication of 
the value of motherhood which often fail to challenge dominant cultural understandings 
around family, work and the values promoted by the market. Indeed, she notes that 
motherhood can be celebrated as an identity decoupled from the everyday care of babies 
and children. I would argue that Stephens’s critiques of such online campaigners and 
activists do not go far enough as many have a poor record of, for example, challenging cuts 
to welfare that affect poor women and the ‘othering’ of single mothers in stark contrast to the 
glamorization of celebrity mothers in the popular media (Littler 2013; McRobbie 2015).  
 
In the final chapter of her book, Stephens turns to ecofeminism and ecofeminist activism, 
where she sees possibilities for meaningful engagement with a reinvigorated ‘feminist 
maternalism’ (Stephens 2011, 143). She sees ecofeminist work on care ethics as a 
theoretically informed re-gendering through examining the intersections between feminism, 
environmentalism and peace politics. She refers briefly to the work of Carol Gilligan, Nel 
Noddings and Jean Tronto (among others) but seemingly without much appreciation of the 
very different approaches taken by such scholars. Tronto, for example, eschews linkages 
between maternalism and care. She also points to Gloria Orenstein’s idea of ‘the femivore’, 
where an ethic of care for children and the environment is expressed through a focus on 
home and community (raising chickens, making jam and growing organic vegetables) in acts 
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of shared resistance to consumer capitalism.  She recognises the ‘uncomfortable ideological 
associations that hark back to the gender politics of the 1950s’ (Stephens 2011, 139) that 
such ideas might raise but contrasts this with the pressures on mothers to return to work 
after childbirth that are captured through images of corporate-sponsored breast pumping. 
However, while Orenstein is recognised as an ecofeminist scholar (see Sturgeon 1997 for an 
overview and critique of her work), the link to ecofeminism more broadly is not well made 
and indeed, a construal of ecofeminist care ethics as grounded in maternalism, whether 
reinvigorated or not, is a mis-reading of ecofeminist work. Leading ecofeminist thought 
around care such as the work of Deane Curtin (1991), Greta Gaard (1993), Marti Kheel 
(1993), Val Plumwood (1993) or Karen Warren (2000) does not refer to ‘mothering as a 
paradigm of political and social care’ (Stephens 2011,141). Niamh Moore, whose work 
Stephens cites in support of her claim that it is time for feminism to move beyond the 
impasse created by accusations of essentialism, rejects the disavowal of maternalism or 
motherhood as incompatible with feminist activism but equally resists the reduction of 
ecofeminism to maternalism.  Moore found no evidence that maternalist discourses were 
dominant among the peace camp activists she studied but instead sees such camps as 
‘sites of struggle over the meaning of woman and the practice of eco/feminist politics, where 
the meanings of woman, and eco/feminism, are not just reified but are also refigured’ (Moore 
2008, 294). Other ecofeminist thinkers explicitly warn against linking ecofeminism with 
maternalism. For example, ecofeminist political theorist Sherilyn MacGregor calls for a 
‘properly political ecofeminism’ that eschews ‘rhetorics rooted in fixed and privatized 
feminized identities that are themselves depoliticised (for example maternalism)’ (2014, 630, 
emphasis in original. See also MacGregor 2006). Thus, while Stephens could perhaps argue 
that ecofeminism resists a purported directive to ‘leave motherhood behind’ as ecofeminism 
does not seek to exclude any group that is oppressed by patriarchal structures, it is difficult 
to claim that it builds its programme on a maternalist platform.  
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The history of ecofeminism offers one explanation as to why some ecofeminists might wish 
to avoid an association with maternalism, howsoever it could be reconfigured. From the turn 
of the century, ecofeminist voices became relatively muted, and according to some (eg 
Moore 2008; Sturgeon 1997; Thompson 2006; Twine 1997), silenced by accusations of 
essentialism, often originating from other feminists.  Critics claimed that ecofeminism 
celebrated a special affinity between women and nature based in biologically-determined 
and embodied experiences of, for example, childbirth or menstruation. Care and nurturing 
were, therefore, ‘womanly’ values expressive of what was disparagingly termed a form of 
motherhood environmentalism (Thompson 2006, 506; Sandilands 1999). This, it was 
argued, was supportive of and colluded with patriarchal ideas where the association of the 
maternal, the polluting body and the emotional with women provides the explanation for 
inherent female inferiority. Similarly dismissive claims were made against ecofeminist 
explorations of human/animal relations while ecofeminist versions of earth-based spirituality 
were labelled as goddess-worship (see Gaard 2011 for a full discussion). Moreover, critics 
claimed that such positions ignored the complexity of women’s experiences which are 
mediated by intersections of class, ethnicity, sexuality or able-bodiness and that 
ecofeminism was a white women’s movement that ignored women of colour. Gaard (2011) 
has comprehensively rebutted such claims, as have Sturgeon (1997) and Moore (2008, 
2015), who argue that ecofeminisms are situated in multiple forms of action and theory that 
contest relations of power and that much of this criticism was unfair, decontextualized and 
inaccurate. However, the ferocity of the attacks on ecofeminism warn that identification with 
a programme based in celebrating maternalism is not without risk. As we shall see, 
approaches to morality based in care have attracted similar critique and it could be 
strategically unwise, as well as theoretically limiting, for ecofeminism to be identified with a 
‘new’ maternalism. An ecofeminism that makes strong links to relationship and embodiment, 
however, does provide the ethical and political grounds for resisting the icy grip of 
neoliberalism and its postmaternal handmaiden. 
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Care, embodiment and the natural world 
I will first outline the general principles of care ethics on which ecofeminists have drawn to 
develop ways of being in the world that are specifically situated in our relationships both 
human and more-than-human. I then develop this further as an ecofeminist ethics that 
values emotion and embodiment and which provides a springboard for action but which is 
not grounded in maternalism.  
 
An ethics of care begins from an understanding of human interaction such that people are 
constantly enmeshed in relationships and not seen primarily as rational actors pursuing their 
own goals and maximising their own interests. Indeed personhood is relational, a becoming-
in-the-world-with-others (Price and Shildrick 2002) which is focused on ‘a capacity to 
reshape and cultivate new relations, not to ever more closely resemble the unencumbered 
abstract rational self of liberal political and moral theories’ (Held 2006, 14). While there are 
different nuances in how care can be defined, I am drawn to Hamington’s definition which 
stresses the embodied dimension to care: 
 
‘Care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical 
considerations to context, relationships and affective knowledge in a manner that can 
be fully understood only if care’s embodied dimension is recognized. Care is 
committed to the flourishing and growth of individuals yet acknowledges our 
interconnectedness and interdependence’ (Hamington 2004, 3) 
 
This is an ethics that values interdependencies and caring relations that connect persons to 
one another. It describes a process of making judgements based in context and real, lived 
experiences and in the constellation of relationships and institutions in which caring is 
positioned. It recognises specific relations of dependency, responsibility and interconnection 
as well as respecting the difference and independence of the other.  
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As a practice it is evident that care underpins human life. All humans and most life-forms 
require care or give care at some point over their lifespans. Care thus flows through 
everyday experience and effort and energy is necessary to form and maintain caring 
relationships such that care is an ongoing process.  An ability to care, to experience 
sympathy, to demonstrate understanding and sensitivity to a situation and to the fate of 
particular and general others through dynamic, imaginative responses to context and 
situation is regarded as the hallmark of moral capacity. Qualities such as empathetic 
responsiveness, emotion, appropriate trust, solidarity and shared concern are to be 
encouraged and developed rather than rejected as potentially threatening (Held 2006).  
 
For Tronto: 
 
On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity 
that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so 
that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, 
and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining 
web. (1993, 103, emphasis in original) 
 
Tronto’s delineation of the world as a web of relationships resonates with the ecocentric 
perspectives that inform ecofeminism. Ecocentrism espouses a view of the world as  ‘… an 
intrinsically dynamic, interrelated web of relations [with] no absolutely discrete entities and 
no absolute dividing lines between the living and the nonliving, the animate and the 
inanimate, or the human and the nonhuman’ (Eckersley 1992, 49). All elements within nature 
are interconnected and all should be respected because they have intrinsic value. As a holist 
philosophy that emphasises respect for the inherent value of individual beings as well as the 
totality of ecological processes and which is sensitive to the relationships that sustain life 
(Plumwood 1993), it is appropriate that ecofeminism has drawn on the moral significance of 
care. For ecofeminism, caring is grounded in an ability to see connections to others who are 
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different from us, perhaps indifferent to us and not necessarily equal or not equal and is 
underpinned by a focus on: 
 
values typically unnoticed, underplayed, or misrepresented in traditional ethics (e.g. 
values of care, love, friendship, and appropriate trust). These are values that 
presuppose that our relationships to others are central to an understanding of who 
we are (Warren 2000, 100). 
 
Care is grounded in a practical morality that sees the self not as atomised nor as self-
optimising, but as positioned in a web of caring relationships more fulfilling than the narrow 
pursuit of self-interest. Ecofeminist philosopher Karen Warren (2000) argues that care, and 
the ability to empathise through care, is a moral emotion essential to ethical motivation, 
deliberation and practice. Ethical action should be located in ‘care-sensitive’ ethics in which 
such sensitivity determines how principles such as duty, utility or justice can provide 
guidance for action.  Appropriate principles are those which take into account the extent to 
which ‘care practices’ are reflected, created and maintained in a given context. Care 
practices are those that maintain, promote or enhance the flourishing of relevant parties. 
Practices that cause unnecessary and avoidable harm to selves and relevant others such as 
the destruction of the stability, diversity and sustainability of first people’s cultures or natural 
ecosystems such as rainforests, oceans or deserts are not care practices and neither are 
those that oppress or exploit others or violate their civil rights. Any claim that humans are 
separate from nature is refuted; humans are biophysical members of an ecological 
community and, at the same time, different, in some respects, from other members of that 
community. The attention to relationships and community does not erase difference, but 
respectfully acknowledges it (Warren 2000).  
 
What is currently largely missing from ecofeminist care ethics is an explicit attention to the 
embodied aspects of care and I have argued elsewhere that ecofeminism needs to embrace 
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the body (XXXX) to challenge the ways that nature and emotionality are cast and to begin to 
reimagine and revalue them. An acceptance of the organic materiality of human bodies, as 
beings who are part of the natural world, can overcome our estrangement from nature and 
remind us that our future and wellbeing is inherently entwined with that of the planet. 
Hamington points out how the body and embodied experience, learning and imagination 
combine to develop understandings of interconnection, engagement and relations with 
others and thus we are empowered to develop care practices (Hamington 2004). The 
potential for an ethics grounded in care to motivate and inspire political action resides in a 
capacity for feeling pain at the distress of others and responding imaginatively. Care and 
compassion enable us to visualise the suffering caused by injustice and to consider how 
best to ameliorate that. In this way, care is not confined within an impersonal straightjacket 
of logic and rationality, and neither is it reduced to maternality, but involves ‘a complex 
weaving of imaginative processes with embodied practices’ (Hamington 2004, 5). This 
includes the interplay between mind and body that produces the embodied experiences 
which enable individuals to develop empathy and the understanding of the other that is often 
not a product of conscious thought, but which originates in the body. We are moved to act 
morally through a personal and embodied caring.  
 
Thus attention to the visceral, embodied aspects of care are an imperative so that the 
current alienation between most of those living in the Global North and the biophysical world 
can be overcome. A recognition that ‘the fleshy, damp immediacy of our own embodied 
existences’ (Neimanis and Walker 2013, 2) is deeply bound up with the impacts of human 
activity on the planet help to connect the imaginary and the corporeal as entwined in ‘a 
common space, a conjoined time [and] a mutual worlding’ (Neimanis and Walker 2013, 3). A 
re-discovery of our ‘earthian’ place means becoming aware of and accepting our fleshiness 
and the frailties of that flesh, as well as recognising the vulnerability of nature. Perception is 
thus shifted to acknowledge the substantial interconnections between human corporeality 
and the more-than-human world. As Alaimo (2008, 238) points out, ‘human corporeality in all 
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its material fleshiness is inseparable from “nature” or “environment”’ such that embracing the 
vulnerability of the body is a recognition of precarious, corporeal openness to the material 
world where the human is not in nature but of nature. Thus we need to reaffirm the visceral 
sensations and emotions experienced through our bodies to begin to develop the kind of 
affective, caring engagement with and embodied knowledge of nature and thus of ourselves 
that might lead us to respond more appropriately to the ecological threats with which 
humanity is faced.   
 
Embodied experiences combine with a caring imagination to create points of departure for 
developing responsive interconnections that inform action. For example, I might have a 
favourite walk through a particular piece of woodland. My relationship with the woodland 
ecology of animals, trees and plants is formed through corporeal and sensual encounters.  I 
know the different colours of the wood as they change through the seasons, hear the 
birdsong and rustling of small animals and smell the wood’s damp, leafy perfume. I have 
been captivated by the patterns made by sunlight through leaves, or the bark of a knarled 
tree or the discovery of fungus nibbled by a mouse. The breeze has touched my skin too as 
it ruffles the tree canopy. This is a form of knowing and meaning creation that extends 
beyond the rational and involves a responsive, emotional engagement with nature which 
values what ‘cannot be fully articulated according to the demands of objectivity … knowledge 
guided by and responsive to the physical environment in which it is practiced’ (Glazebrook 
2005, 80). It is a corporeal and affective knowing in and through the body which goes 
beyond the propositional knowledge generated by gathering facts and information and a 
means of learning that challenges the excessive claims to universal truths of knowledge 
grounded in rationality which is disembodied and transcendent (see also Alaimo 2008, 
2009). This embodied and situated knowledge can be gained from direct experience of 
‘concrete others’ (Benhabib 1992, 164) which facilitates our understanding of at least some 
of the other’s needs, and, at the same time, underlines the nature of our differences (Porter 
2006). The wood with whom I have a relationship is not an abstract entity that is 
18 
 
interchangeable with any other, but has a material presence that develops connection 
through sympathetic identification. Such experiences build situated knowledge and reasons 
to care, but they also facilitate making connections between the well-being and flourishing of 
the particular, including the self, as intimately intertwined with the wellbeing and flourishing 
of the general (Curtin, 1991; Gaard, 1993; Plumwood, 1993; Warren, 2000). To care about 
and understand the particular environmental, social and economic struggles of humans and 
other life forms we must recognise and have some level of understanding of those issues as 
features of contemporary social structures. To care about and understand such structural 
features, we must recognise how they exist in particular lives and experiences. 
 
One day, I hear that the woodland is threatened by a road-building programme which will 
tear down the trees and replace them with a highway. The environmental campaigner 
George Monbiot has written that we care about the living world because we love it. 
Acknowledging this love engages the imagination and the intellect and inspires belief in a 
way that appeals to self-interest or to cold rationality cannot (Monbiot 2015). Thus it is out of 
love that I will act to try to protect the wood and resist the developers, not out of a rational 
calculation of the costs and benefits that might accrue to me or to my community. To inform 
that resistance, I will learn more about the political and economic systems within which road-
building is more important than the preservation of natural space. When I hear of other 
threats to the natural environment, even though they might be places which I have never 
visited, I will remember how I felt – the trace of those feelings will resonate within my body – 
and I can imagine how those affected, human and other life forms, will be impacted. 
Experiencing loss, anger and sadness myself allows me to develop empathy: the response 
to an other that combines embodied and other forms of knowledge with emotion to enable 
me to understand the situation of the other. Our capacity to care thus extends beyond our 
personal experiences to an ability to respond to difference, and to visualise what the other, 
given their specificity, is undergoing. This pre-supposes a sense of shared vulnerability to 
suffering and an ability to respond to the other’s pain (Alaimo 2009). Equally, we 
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demonstrate the equal worth of the other by furthering their flourishing. The actions required 
of us to promote such flourishing can only be discerned by careful attention to and respect 
for the other’s needs and we should make room in ourselves to be moved by the 
experiences of the other and not just because the other’s pain resonates with our own 
(Porter 2006). In this way, embodied care is not reduced to individual bodily experience but 
works together with the imagination to allow us to overcome the limitations of individual 
physical existence and reach out to the other over time, space and difference (Hamington 
2004). We can extend care to those with whom we have no direct personal relationship and 
who are in circumstances that perhaps we have not experienced ourselves but who are part 
of the web of interconnections in which we are situated; orang-utans threatened by forest 
fires in Indonesia, the plight of refugees fleeing war or other deprivations or the 
circumstances of bonded labourers. As Hamington (2004) points out, it is through our 
imagination that we are moved to care even for fictional characters in books, plays or films 
and indeed, the imaginative and emotional shifts stimulated by engagement with narrative, 
whether fictional or based in ‘reality’, develops and increases the capacity for care (Manning 
1992). The concretization of the other also therefore emerges from indirect experience such 
as through the news or other media and through the vicarious experiences produced through 
engagement with the arts whether that be fiction, poetry or visual art (Gayá and Phillips 
2015, Phillips 2015, 2014). We cannot possibly have full access to the experience of even 
proximate others, let alone to distant others where that distance is between human and other 
life forms, but while these accounts often anthropomorphise the actualities of the more-than-
human, they challenge us to engage with difference, to see the familiar from a radical 
perspective, and provide an additional means for encountering and reflecting on the 
experiences of the other. It is this empathetic act of imagination that allows a move from the 
personal and known to the wider world and to the unknown as we have to consider how to 
act in new situations or when faced with unknown others.  Both our direct and indirect 
encounters with the other combine embodied feeling and caring imagination stimulated by 
active engagement and listening so that we hear and respond to the plight of distant others. 
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Indeed, for Hamington (2004), it is part of our moral responsibility to seek out experiences 
that develop embodied understanding and connection with the other. This is a wider, more 
inclusive, vision on which to build care ethics than a narrow appeal to maternalism. 
 
As noted earlier in this paper, I pointed to the critiques levelled at ecofeminism in which it 
was claimed that it was an essentialist form of environmentalism that made particular claims 
for women’s innate connection to the earth. Similar minefields are strewn around concepts of 
care grounded in the relationship between mothers and children which makes any appeal to 
maternalism a high risk strategy for ecofeminism. The early work of care ethicists such as 
Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) was interpreted as positioning care as an essentially 
female practice and disposition because women are more likely to experience care-giving 
activities and therefore have a greater understanding of and empathy for practices of care. 
Noddings, in particular, argued that women’s orientation to care was shaped by the loving 
and emotional bonds developed through maternal experience which challenged the concept 
of a rational, disembodied and detached self. This work was widely criticised for promoting 
an essentialist view of women, for ignoring the cultural specificities of ‘mothering’, for failing 
to take account of the hierarchical nature of mother/child relations and more generally for 
‘reaffirming a dichotomy between those who care and those cared for’ (Beasley and Baachi 
2005, 59). In her later work, Gilligan (1995) herself was clear that care should not be labelled 
a ‘feminine’ ethic to be associated with essentialised female traits such as passivity, 
irrationality and, importantly from the perspective of care, a desire to nurture at the expense 
of the self. Gilligan asserts that ‘selflessness or self-sacrifice is built into the very definition of 
care when caring is premised on an opposition between relationships and self-development’ 
such that an ethic identified with putative feminine traits in a patriarchal order would posit 
relationships that are fundamentally unequal (Gilligan 1995, 122). A one-sided 
preoccupation with the flourishing of others is thus deeply problematic particularly when it is 
premised on the prior assumption that women are ‘naturally’ able and willing to sacrifice their 
own needs and development in the interests of others.  
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It is also the case that caring is usually a socially stratified activity in Western society where 
the work of care is not only gendered but also raced and classed such that it falls on those 
who have the least power and voice. Indeed, more recently, it has come to be understood 
not as a distinctively or exclusively feminine perspective, but as a potential orientation 
emerging from political or social subordination which includes gender, but also encompasses 
race, class and other categories (Simola 2010; Skeggs 2014; Tronto 1987). This has been 
described in positive terms as a strategy of solidarity that helps relatively excluded groups 
cope with vulnerability and as reflecting a vision for a more compassionate society that might 
emerge in those groups because of their experiences of oppression. However, care ethics 
has been critiqued for ignoring such power assymetries, a concern amplified by Noddings’s 
assertion that becoming better at caring for oneself can be morally justified as it leads to 
better caring for others. For Hoagland (1991), care could become a one-way-traffic that is 
fraught with the potential for personal and political danger as it could be used to maintain 
current divisions of labour; feminist scholarship, for example, has pointed to the ‘tyranny of 
maternity’ generated by the repetitive and exhausting daily round of housework and 
childcare and the ways in which this burden still falls disproportionately on women 
(McRobbie 2013; Wood and Newton 2006). The emphasis placed on the importance of 
relationships has therefore prompted some critics to express concern that women and other 
marginalised groups may be led to prioritise the other at the expense of the self; thus 
supporting oppressive social constraints placed on women’s behaviour in particular. 
 
The counter to such critiques enlarges the focus of care beyond the individual and beyond 
maternalism as a necessary move to bring about the social and political changes required to 
reinvigorate more-than-human relationships and to ensure the flourishing of life on this 
planet. An ecofeminist, embodied ethics of care such as I have outlined points to the 
potentially liberatory and radical aspects of relatedness and does not ground its argument in 
a reification of women’s ‘maternal’ propensity to care. It is liberatory because it is available to 
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men and to women, enabling and empowering all those who are excluded from hegemonic 
masculinity’s construction of the ideal to flourish as a self in relationship. It is radical 
because, as Curtin (1991) points out, caring must be understood and developed as integral 
to a wider political agenda which challenges the atomisation of the individual amplified by 
neoliberalism. Caring thus focuses on a relational sense of self that is nonabusive and 
nonexploitative, that embraces but does not subsume the difference of the other and which 
extends care to contexts in the public sphere where it is currently deemed inappropriate. 
More importantly, it is radical also because it starts to address the challenge of how can we 
live differently, of finding ‘a way of belonging differently in the world’ (Gibson-Graham, 2011, 
1) that opens up possibilities for re-imagining humanity in ways that are exciting and, more 
pragmatically, necessary in order to survive at all. 
 
Conceptualising the self as part of a wider web of interconnected selves reduces the risk of 
falling into a paternalistic trap where there is an asymmetrical relationship between those 
who are vulnerable, dependent and in need of care, and those who deliver it (Hughes, 
McKie, Hopkins and Watson 2005), or conversely, that giving care necessarily involves the 
privileging of the other over the self. This dualistic concept of care has been supported by 
assumptions that care relationships are exclusively dyadic such as that of mother and child 
espoused by maternalist thinking. However, Tronto points out that such assumptions are 
inaccurate and a distortion of care because, to follow the same example, mothers do not 
provide care alone but childrearing is situated in a complex set of social relationships that 
includes the wider family, neighbours, health and education services and other carers. 
Moreover, Tronto argues that the particular bond between mothers and children and its 
representation as the primary relationship of life is a social construction and one that is 
relatively recent (Tronto 2013). The capacity to see the self as vulnerable and to recognise 
that those who receive care and those who give care are the same people undercuts the 
processes whereby care recipients are viewed as other and, for Tronto, ‘forces us to 
recognize the limits of market life as the metaphor for all human actions’ (2013, 151).  
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So a recognition of the embodiment and vulnerability that are shared by the more-than-
human moves the focus of care away from a primary engagement with those deemed to be 
needy or dependent, such as the maternal relation to a child, to the interdependence of all 
beings on the planet. It casts care as a process which requires work, but without expecting 
reciprocation, and which takes place in the intersections between more-than-humans. It 
foregrounds the interconnections between caring as a set of values and caring as a set of 
material and embodied practices rather than as a ‘thing’ which is bestowed by one party on 
another. Moreover, this process of active caring does not background emotion but 
emphasises the importance of feeling that is also embodied, and the need to reflect on 
convictions and feelings. It is thus also distinguished from forms of postmaternity that are 
antagonistic to embodied experience and emotional connectedness. Active and embodied 
caring encourage an understanding of self and humanity as part of nature such that we can 
‘dare to care’ (Warren 2000, 212); an essential precursor to political action which could 
challenge the dominance of neoliberalism. Thus an appeal to maternalism is neither 
necessary nor desirable in order to emphasise the importance of a caring that is and should 
be embodied through emotional attachments to animals, landscapes or ecosystems which 
increase awareness of interdependence and foster action and which signify the need to 
make nature present in the conscious life of the Global North.  
 
Concluding thoughts 
A greater emotional and embodied connectivity with nature, a recognition of our vulnerability 
and an embracing of the importance of care is part of a more positive imaginary of an 
ecology of self in relationship with the more-than-human which contrasts with what Ghassan 
Hage (cited in Beasley and Bacchi 2005) argues is the perception that states and other 
institutions care for increasingly smaller groups of their ‘stakeholders’ and see nature only as 
a resource. The resulting insecurity, hyper-competition and scapegoating of ‘others’ that 
results is socially destructive such that it becomes increasingly difficult to care for each other 
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or for the environment (Beasley and Bacchi 2005). An ecofeminist approach to embodied 
care is thus a resource to inform political action that can challenge the dominant neoliberalist 
discourses and practices that are damaging our planet and threatens more-than-human 
futures. This account of care suggests an alternative to the neoliberalist assumption of an 
autonomous, atomised and self-optimising individual though a focus on elements such as 
relationship, emotion and intersubjectivity that neoliberalism and its postmaternal derivatives 
disregards. The combination of embodied elements of care with affective knowledge fosters 
compassionate connection that motivates action.  Action, experience and understanding are 
held together in a fluid but self-reinforcing relationship where a philosophy of care and 
connectedness informs and is informed by action. For Joan Tronto: 
 
Care is a way of framing political issues that makes their impact, and concern with 
human [and more-than-human] lives, direct and immediate. Within the care 
framework, political issues can make sense and connect to each other. Under these 
conditions, political involvement increases dramatically (Tronto 1993, 177) 
 
But to build societies grounded in care will require a reconception of the human self in 
mutualistic terms – ‘a self-in-relationship with nature, formed not in the drive for mastery and 
control of the other but in a balance of mutual transformation and negotiation’ (Plumwood 
2006, 142). This is based in self-knowledge and an ability to distinguish self-interests from 
those of others, and a willingness to pay attention to the independence of the other. This is a 
relationship built on foundations of respect, care and love as we strive to replace more 
instrumental and mechanistic models that have not served thus far to mitigate disastrous 
outcomes for the more-than-human. Ecofeminist care could refigure the postmaternal, not by 
specifically pointing to the relationships between mothers and children as exemplars of care 
and neither by ‘leaving motherhood behind’ but by building on care for particular others to 
enhance wider and more generalized concerns and for feeling and understanding the 
relationships between particular commitments and losses and those of more distant others.  
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Finally, I hope I have demonstrated that an appeal to maternalism is limiting. An embodied 
conception of care, grounded in ecofeminist principles, such as I have outlined provides 
more vibrant, exciting and radical inspiration that is sorely needed if humanity is to 
reconfigure its place within the world. 
 
 
References 
 
Alaimo, Stacey. 2008. “Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature”. In 
Material Feminisms, edited by Stacey Alaimo and Susan Hekman, 237-64. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Alaimo, Stacey. 2009. “Insurgent Vulnerability and the Carbon Footprint of Gender.” Kvinder, 
Kon & Forskning 3-4: 22-35. 
 
Barad, Karen. 2003. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
Comes to Matter”. Signs 28 (3): 801-831. 
 
Barad, Karen. 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement 
of Matter and Meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Beasley Chris and Bacchi Carol L. 2005. “The Political Limits of ‘Care’ in Re-Imagining 
Interconnection/Community and an Ethical Future.” Australian Feminist Studies 20 (46): 49-
64. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
 
26 
 
Borgerson, Janet. L. 2007. “On the Harmony of Feminist Ethics and Business Ethics.” 
Business and Society Review 112 (4): 477-509. 
 
Braun, Bruce. 2004. “Querying Posthumanisms.” Geoforum  35: 269–73. 
 
Castree, Noel. 2008. “Neoliberalising Nature: The Logics of Deregulation and Reregulation.” 
Environment and Planning A 40 (1): 131-152. 
 
Colebrook, Claire. 2011. “Earth Felt the Wound: The Affective Divide.” Journal for Politics, 
Gender and Culture 8 (1): 45-58. 
 
Cudworth, Erika. 2005. Developing Eco-feminist Theory: The Complexity of Difference. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Cuomo, Chris. 2002. “On Ecofeminist Philosophy.” Ethics and the Environment 7 (2): 1-11. 
 
Curtin Deane. 1991. “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care.” Hypatia 6 (1): 60-74. 
 
Dobson, Andrew. 2009. “10:10 and the Politics of Climate Change.” Open Democracy. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/10-10-and-the-politics-of-climate-change. 
 
Dowling, Emma. and Harvie, David. 2014. “Harnessing the Social: State, Crisis and (Big) 
Society.” Sociology 48 (5): 869-86. 
 
Eckersley, Robyn. 1992. Environmentalism and Political Theory. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
 
Fraser, Nancy. 2009. “Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History”. New Left Review 
56: n.p, Available from https://newleftreview.org/II/56/nancy-fraser-feminism-capitalism-and-
the-cunning-of-history. 
 
27 
 
Gaard, Greta. 1993. “Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature.” In Ecofeminism: 
Women, Animals, Nature, edited by G. Gaard, 1-12. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Gaard, Greta. 2011. “Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting Essentialism and Re-Placing 
Species in a Material Feminist Environmentalism.” Feminist Formations 23 (2): 26-53. 
 
Gayá, Patricia. and Phillips, Mary E. 2015. “Imagining a Sustainable Future: Eschatology, 
Bateson’s Ecology of Mind and Arts-Based Practice.” Organization. Advance online 
publication. doi: 10.1177/1350508415619240. 
 
Gibson-Graham, J.K. 2011. “A feminist project of belonging for the Anthropocene”. Gender, 
Place and Culture 18 (1): 1-21, 
 
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Gilligan, Carol. 1995. “Hearing the difference: Theorizing Connection.” Hypatia 10 (2): 120–
127. 
 
Glazebrook, Trish. 2005. “Gynocentric Eco-Logics.” Ethics and the Environment 10 (2): 75-
99. 
 
Hamington, Maurice. 2004. Embodied Care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and 
Feminist Ethics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Haraway, Donna. 2008. When Species Meet, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
 
28 
 
Held, Virginia. 2006. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. 1991. “Some Thoughts about Caring.” In Feminist Ethics, edited by 
Claudia Card, 246-263. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
 
Hopwood, Bill, Mellor, Mary and O’Brien, Geoff. 2005. “Sustainable Development: Mapping 
Different Approaches.” Sustainable Development 13 (1): 38-52. 
 
Horkheimer, Max. 1947/1974. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum. 
 
Hughes, Bill, McKie, Linda, Hopkins, Debra and Watson, Nick. 2005. “Love’s Labours Lost: 
Feminism, the Disabled People’s Movement and an Ethic of Care.” Sociology 39 (2): 259-
275. 
 
Kheel, Marti. 1993. “From Heroic to Holistic Ethics: The Ecofeminist Challenge.” In 
Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, edited by Greta Gaard, 243-271. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
 
Kheel, Marti. 2008. Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
 
Lahar, Stephanie. 1991. “Ecofeminist Theory and Grassroots Politics.” Hypatia 6 (1): 28-45. 
 
Larner, Wendy. 2003. “Neoliberalism?” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 
(5): 509-512. 
 
29 
 
Lemke, Thomas. 2001. “ ‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Foucault's Lecture at The Collège 
De France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality.” Economy and Society 30 (2): 190-207. 
 
Littler, Jo. 2013.  “The Rise of the ‘Yummy Mummy’: Popular Conservatism and the 
Neoliberal Maternal in Contemporary British Culture.” Communication, Culture & Critique. 6: 
227-243. 
 
MacGregor, Sheralyn. 2014. “Only Resist: Feminist Ecological Citizenship and the Post-
Politics of Climate Change.” Hypatia 29 (3): 617-633. 
 
MacGregor, Sheralyn. 2006. Beyond Mothering Earth: Ecological Citizenship and the Politics 
of Care. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
 
McRobbie, Angela. 2013. “Feminism, the Family and the New ‘Mediated’ Maternalism.” New 
Formations, 80-81: 119-137. 
 
McRobbie, Angela. 2008. The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change. 
London, Sage. 
 
Manning, Rita C. 1992. Speaking from the Heart: A Feminist Perspective on Ethics. Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Monbiot George. 2015. “Why we fight for the living world: it's about love, and it's time we 
said so.” The Guardian, available from 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/16/pope-encyclical-value-of-living-
world 
 
30 
 
Moore, Niamh. 2008. “Eco/Feminism, Non-Violence and the Future of Feminism.” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 10 (3): 282-98. 
 
Moore, Niamh. 2015. “Eco/feminist Genealogies: Renewing Promises and New 
Possibilities.” In Contemporary Perspectives on Ecofeminism, edited by M. Phillips and N. 
Rumens, 19-37. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Murphy, Joseph. 2000. “Ecological Modernisation.” Geoforum, 31: 1-8. 
 
Neimanis, Astrida and Walker, Rachel L. 2014. “Weathering: Climate change and the ‘Thick 
Time’ of Transcorporeality.” Hypatia 29 (3): 558-75. 
 
Noddings, Nel. 1984. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Phillips, Mary E. 2014. “Re-writing Corporate Environmentalism: Ecofeminism, Corporeality 
and the Language of Feeling.” Gender, Work and Organization 21 (5): 443-58. 
 
Phillips, Mary E. 2015. “Developing Ecofeminist Corporeality: Writing the Body as Activist 
Poetics.” In Contemporary Perspectives on Ecofeminism edited by Mary E. Phillips and 
Nicholas Rumens, 57-75. London: Routledge. 
 
Plumwood, Val. 1991. “Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and 
the Critique of Rationalism.” Hypatia 6 (1): 3-27. 
 
Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, London: Routledge. 
 
31 
 
Plumwood, Val. (2002). Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Plumwood, Val. 2006. “Feminism.” In Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, edited 
by Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley, 51-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Porter, Elisabeth. 2006. “Can Politics Practice Compassion?” Hypatia 21 (4): 97-123. 
 
Price, Janet and Shildrick, Margaret. 2002. “Bodies Together: Touch, Ethics and Disability.” 
In Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory edited by Mairian Corker and Tom 
Shakespeare, 62-75. London: Continuum. 
 
Probyn, Elspeth. 2014. “Women following fish in a more-than-human world” Gender, Place 
and Culture, 21 (5): 589-603, 
 
Sandilands, Catriona. 1999. The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for 
Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Seyfang, Gill. 2005. “Shopping for Sustainability: Can Sustainable Consumption Promote 
Ecological Citizenship?” Environmental Politics 14 (2): 290-236. 
 
Shove, Elizabeth and Walker, Gordon. 2010. “Governing Transitions in the Sustainability of 
Everyday Life.” Research Policy 39 (4): 471-476. 
 
Simola, Sheldene. 2010. “Anti-Corporate Anger as a Form of Care-Based Moral Agency.” 
Journal of Business Ethics 94: 255-269. 
 
32 
 
Skeggs, Beverly. 2014. “Values Beyond Value? Is Anything Beyond the Logic of Capital?” 
British Journal of Sociology 65 (1): 1-20. 
 
Stephens, Julie. 2011. Confronting Postmaternal Thinking. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Sturgeon, Noel. 1997. Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and Political 
Action. London: Routledge. 
 
Taylor, Charles. 1995. Philosophical arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Thompson, Charis. 2006. “Back to Nature? Resurrecting Ecofeminism after Poststructuralist 
and Third-Wave Feminism.” Isis 97 (3): 505-12. 
 
Tronto, Joan C. 1987. “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care.” Signs 12 (4): 644-
663. 
 
Tronto, Joan C. 1993. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Tronto, Joan C. 2013. Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality and Justice. New York: New 
York University Press. 
 
Twine, Richard T. 1997. “Masculinity, Nature, Ecofeminism.” Ecofem.org/journal, available 
from  http://www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/twine/ecofem/masc.pdf. 
 
Warren, Karen. 2000. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why 
It Matters. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 
33 
 
 
Whatmore, Sarah. 1999. “Human Geographies: Rethinking the ‘Human’ in Human 
Geography”. In Human Geography Today, edited by Doreen  Massey, John Allen and Philip 
Sarre, 22-39, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Whatmore, Sarah. 2002. Hybrid geographies: natures, cultures, spaces. London: Sage. 
 
Whatmore, Sarah. 2004. “Humanism’s Excess: Some Thoughts on the 
‘Post-human/ist’ Agenda.” Environment and Planning A 36: 1360–63. 
 
Wood, Glenice J. and Newton Janice. 2006. “Childlessness and Women Managers: ‘Choice’, 
Context and Discourses.” Gender, Work & Organization 13 (4): 338-358. 
 
World Wildlife Fund. 2014. Living Planet Report, available from 
http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/723/files/original/WWF-LPR2014-
low_res.pdf?1413912230&_ga=1.230044959.269800605.1426861329. 
 
 
i Whether ‘equality feminism’ is complicit in neoliberalist processes is a debate beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, see McRobbie (2008), Fraser (2009) and in particular McRobbie (2013) 
for an interesting discussion on ‘new maternity’.  
ii For a history of ecofeminism, see Sturgeon (1997) and Moore (2015). 
iii I include myself as a being who dwells in the geographic and cultural space of the Global North. I 
have no wish to present myself as an objective observer who sits above or apart from the concerns I 
have outlined. 
                                                          
